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I.

INTRODUCTION

I

n 2019 and again in 2020, President Trump pardoned or otherwise granted
clemency to a number of men charged with or convicted of conduct constituting war crimes. 1 Trump’s actions were widely condemned, 2 including by
some legal scholars who argued that Trump’s intervention in these cases
could itself constitute a war crime under the doctrine of command responsibility. 3
This article explores one element of the doctrine of command responsibility invoked by those alleging that President Trump’s pardons could
amount to war crimes: a commander’s duty to punish war crimes by his sub-

1. See Mihir Zaveri, Trump Pardons Ex-Army Soldier Convicted of Killing Iraqi Man, NEW
YORK TIMES (May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/us/trump-pardonmichael-behenna.html; Nicholas Wu & John Fritze, Trump Pardons Servicemembers in High Profile War Crimes Cases, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2019/11/15/donald-trump-pardons-clint-lorance-mathew-golsteyn-warcrime-cases/1229083001/; Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes
Cases, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/
15/us/trump-pardons.html; Michael Safi, Trump Pardons Blackwater Contractors Jailed for Massacre of Iraq Civilians, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2020/dec/23/trump-pardons-blackwater-contractors-jailed-for-massacre-of-iraqcivilians.
2. See Rachel E. VanLandingham, Betrayer in Chief? Pardoning Troops Accused or Convicted of
Murder Would Wound Military, USA TODAY (May 21, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/21/donald-trump-military-pardons-column/374456100
2/ (warning that President Trump’s pardon of a convicted war criminal will have a negative
effect on U.S. “military good order and discipline”); Chris Jenks, Sticking It to Yourself: Preemptive Pardons for Battlefield Crimes Undercut Military Justice and Military Effectiveness, JUST SECURITY
(May 20, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64185/sticking-it-to-yourself-preemptivepardons-for-battlefield-crimes-undercut-military-justice-and-military-effectiveness/; Donald J. Guter et al., The American Way of War Includes Fidelity to the Law: Preemptive Pardons Break
That Code, JUST SECURITY, (May 24, 2019) https://www.justsecurity.org/64260/the-american-way-of-war-includes-fidelity-to-law-preemptive-pardons-break-that-code/;
David
Lapan, President Trump Is Damaging Our Military: War Crimes Cases Are the Latest Example, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/67310/president-trump-is-damaging-our-military-war-crimes-cases-are-the-latest-example/.
3. See Gabor Rona, Can a Pardon Be a War Crime?: When Pardons Themselves Violate the
Laws of War, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 24, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/64288/can-apardon-be-a-war-crime-when-pardons-themselves-violate-the-laws-of-war/; Stuart Ford,
Has President Trump Committed a War Crime by Pardoning War Criminals?, 35 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 757 (2020).
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ordinates. Specifically, this piece examines the United States’ own past recognition of the duty to punish as an element of command responsibility under
the law of war.
The reason for this focus is to demonstrate how deeply rooted the duty
to punish is in the United States’ stated understanding of command responsibility. The principle that a commander has an obligation to punish war
crimes by his subordinates is not a progressive development of the law promoted by the advocacy community. Instead, the duty to punish stands out
as an ancient legal norm interwoven into the domestic law of the United
States and which the United States has incorporated into international legal
instruments. The history reviewed in this article illustrates a through line in
the professed values of the United States, from the command of the Continental Army by General George Washington, to the Nuremberg trials, to
efforts at accountability for Balkan atrocities and the struggles for justice for
the thousands of Americans murdered on 9/11. The lesson from this history
is clear, if not always appreciated: commanders who fail to punish their subordinates for war crimes may themselves be war criminals.
This article examines the previous recognition by the United States of the
duty to punish. It does not seek to undertake a de novo review of State practice
and opinio juris. Nor does this article attempt to delineate the scope or content
of the duty to punish, much less apply that duty to any specific set of facts.
Finally, this article does not seek to address the many other legal issues raised
by President Trump’s pardons of specific individuals, including how the duty
to punish may interact with other international and domestic legal obligations and authorities, including the President’s pardon power under Article
II of the Constitution.
II.

WAR CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

War crimes are generally defined as serious violations of the law of war which
entail individual criminal liability under international law. 4 Under the doctrine of command responsibility, a commander may in some circumstances

4. See HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 8-2 (2019) [hereinafter FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C] (“For purposes of this publication, war crimes are serious violations of LOAC that are punishable by
criminal sanctions.”).
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incur criminal liability in connection with war crimes committed by his subordinates. 5
Command responsibility imposes both forward-looking and backwardlooking obligations upon a commander to promote compliance with the law
of war by his subordinates. Ex ante, a commander has an obligation to prevent war crimes by his subordinates. Ex post, a commander has an obligation
to punish war crimes committed by his subordinates. A commander’s failure
to uphold either his duty to prevent or duty to punish may give rise to his
own responsibility for war crimes. 6
This duty to punish has been a key element of command responsibility
for centuries. As early as 1439, King Charles VII of France issued an ordinance identifying the failure of a commander to discipline a subordinate as a
basis for the punishment of the commander.
The King orders each captain or lieutenant to be held responsible for the
abuses, ills, and offenses committed by members of his company, and that
as soon as he receives any complaint . . . he bring the offender to justice . .
. . If he fails to do so or covers up the misdeed . . . the captain shall be deemed
responsible for the offense, as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the
same way as the offender would have been. 7

III.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE DUTY TO PUNISH

A. U.S. Articles of War
The duty to punish as an element of command responsibility was embedded
in the American understanding of the law of war even before the United
States declared its independence. The Provisional Congress of the Massachusetts Bay Colony adopted Articles of War on April 5, 1775, which provided that:

5. For an overview of command responsibility, see generally William H. Parks, Command
Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 1 (1973); Illias Bantekas, Contemporary
Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 (1999);
GUENAEL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY (2009).
6. See Bantekas, supra note 5 (describing the elements of command responsibility).
7. 13 ORDONNANCES DES ROIS DE FRANCE DE LA TROISIÉME RACE 308 (1782),
quoted in THEODOR MERON, HENRY’S LAWS AND SHAKESPEARE’S WARS 149 n.40 (1990)
(emphasis added).
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Every officer, commanding in quarters or on a march, shall keep good order, and, to the utmost of his power, redress all such abuses or disorders
which may be committed by any officer or soldier under his command: If
upon any complaint [being] made to him, of officers or soldiers beating, or
otherwise ill-treating any person, or of committing any kind of riot, to the
disquieting of the inhabitants of this Continent; he the said commander, who
shall refuse or omit to see justice done on the offender or offenders, and reparation
made to the party or parties injured, as far as the offender’s wages shall
enable him or them, shall, upon due proof thereof, be punished as ordered by
a general court-martial, in such manner as if he himself had committed the crimes or
disorders complained of . . . . 8

The Second Continental Congress reproduced this language in Article
XII of the Articles of War, adopted on June 30, 1775 9 (a week after George
Washington was commissioned as Commander in Chief), and again in Article IX of the Articles of War, adopted on September 20, 1776. 10 The 1806
Articles of War incorporated the duty to punish in Articles 32 11 and 33. 12
8. Massachusetts Provisional Congress, Articles of War art. XI (1775) (emphasis added).
9. Continental Congress, Articles of War art. XII (June 30, 1775), https://avalon.law.
yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_06-30-75.asp.
10. Continental Congress, Articles of War § IX, art. 1 (Sept. 20, 1776), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/contcong_09-20-76.asp.
11. Articles of War, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, 2 Stat. 359, 363 (“Every officer commanding in
quarters, garrisons or on the march, shall keep good order, and, to the utmost of his power,
redress all abuses or disorders which may be committed by any other or soldier under his
command; if; upon compliant made to him of officers or soldiers beating or otherwise illtreating any person, or disturbing fairs or markets, or of committing any kinds of riots, to
the disquieting of the citizens of the United States, he, the said commander, who shall reuse
or omit to see justice done to the offender or offenders, and reparation made to the party
or parties injured, as far as part of the offenders pay shall enable him or them, shall, upon
proof thereof, be cashiered, or otherwise punished, as a general court martial shall direct.”).
12. Id. at 364 (“When any commissioned officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital
crime, or of having used violence, or committed any offense against person or property of
any citizen of the United States, such as punishable by the known laws of the land, the
commanding officer and officers of every regiment, troop, or company, to which the person
or persons so accused shall belong; are hereby required; upon application duly made by, or
in behalf of; the party or parties injured; to use their utmost endeavors to deliver over such
accused person or persons to the civil magistrate, and likewise to be aiding and assisting to
the officers of justice to bring him or them to trial. If any commanding officer or officers
shall willfully neglect, or shall refuse, upon application aforesaid, to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil magistrates, or to be aiding and assisting officers of
justice in apprehending such person or persons, the officer or officers so offending shall be
cashiered.”).
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In addition, during the nineteenth century, the duty to punish was also
sometimes inferred as an element of the “general” article of the Articles of
War. In his commentary on Article 62, 13 William Winthrop cites the “failure
to bring offending inferiors to punishment” as an example of conduct
deemed an offence under General Orders issued in 1862 and 1890. 14
B. Proposed Post-World War I War Crimes Tribunal
Although the United States had clearly acknowledged that a commander’s
duty to punish subordinates was an element of U.S. military law, at the end
of the First World War, the United States also took the position that the duty
to punish was an element of command responsibility under the international
law of war. In 1919, an international “Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties” convened in Versailles on the margins of the Paris Peace Conference. 15 The Commission was
charged, inter alia, with inquiring into and reporting upon “[t]he constitution
and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offenses (crimes
relating to the war).” 16
The U.S. representatives on the body, Secretary of State Robert Lansing
and international lawyer James Brown Scott, acknowledged that in certain
circumstances it would be appropriate for an international criminal tribunal
(as opposed to the domestic military tribunals of individual belligerents) to
try defendants for war crimes under international law.
[I]f an act violating the laws and customs of war committed by an enemy
affected more than one country, a tribunal could be formed of the countries affected by uniting the national commissions or courts thereof, in
which event the tribunal would be formed by the mere assemblage of the

13. Articles of War, 1874 art. 62, 18 Stat. 228 (1874) (“All crimes not capital, and all
disorders and neglects, which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war, are to
be taken cognizance of by a general, of a regimental, garrison, or field-officers’ court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offence, and punished at the discretion of such
court.”).
14. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 726 (2nd ed. 1920).
15. Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 14
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1920).
16. Id. at 117.
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members, bringing with them the law to be applied, namely, the laws and
customs of war . . . . 17

Nonetheless, the United States had a number of reservations to the
Commission’s specific proposal for a tribunal, which it detailed in a memorandum. Many of these objections flowed from concerns that the law to be
applied by the proposed tribunal would be ex post facto. 18 One of these objections related to the standard for command responsibility to be applied by the
proposed tribunal. One of the categories of persons to be tried before the
tribunal proposed by the Commission was those exercising command responsibility.
Against all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including heads of state, who order, or, with knowledge thereof and with power
to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war (it
being understood that no such abstention should constitute a defense for
the actual perpetrators).19

In its memorandum of reservations, the United States outlined its views
of the appropriate contours of command responsibility as a mode of liability.
Lansing and Scott stated that they were “unalterably opposed” to an earlier
proposed formulation of command responsibility under which “persons
were declared liable because they ‘abstained from preventing, putting an end
to, or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war.’” 20
In elaborating on the correct standard for command responsibility under
the law of war, Lansing and Scott explained:
To establish responsibility in such cases it is elementary that the individual
sought to be punished should have knowledge of the commission of the
acts of a criminal nature and that he should have possessed the power as well as
the authority to prevent, to put an end to, or repress them. Neither knowledge
of commission nor ability to prevent is alone sufficient. The duty or obligation to act is essential. They must exist in conjunction, and a standard of
liability which does not include them all is to be rejected. 21
17. Id. at 142.
18. Id. at 147.
19. Id. at 121.
20. Id. at 143.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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In other words, there was no strict liability under the doctrine of command
responsibility. To the contrary, under the law of war a commander could
only be held criminally responsible for failing to punish those crimes by his
subordinates of which he had knowledge.
C. Post-World War II War Crimes Trials
Although the international criminal tribunal contemplated at Versailles after
World War I was never realized, war crimes tribunals were established in the
wake of World War II by the victorious allies acting jointly (e.g., the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) and by the individual victors acting
alone (e.g., the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunal). Many of the war crimes
tribunals created by the United States recognized command responsibility as
a mode of liability for war crimes, though in cases such as United States v.
Tomoyuki Yamashita 22 and the Hostage Case, 23 the tribunals did not articulate
the elements of this mode of liability. And though the U.S. Nuremberg Military Tribunal did not specify all the elements of command responsibility in
the High Command Case, it did reject a strict liability for commanders, echoing
the views expressed by the United States at Versailles in 1919. In doing so,
the tribunal explicitly contemplated the potential application of the doctrine
of command responsibility to the president as commander in chief of the
U.S. military. 24
22. Trial of Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Military Commission, Oct. 8–Dec. 7, 1945, 4
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (1948); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
23. United States v. Wilhelm List, et al. (The Hostage Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 1271 (1950) (“A commanding general of occupied territory is charged with the
duty of maintaining peace and order, punishing crime, and protecting lives and property
within the area of his command. His responsibility is coextensive with his area of command.
He is charged with notice of occurrences taking place within that territory. He may require
adequate reports of all occurrences that come within the scope of his power and, if such
reports are incomplete or otherwise inadequate, he is obliged to require supplementary reports to apprize him of all the pertinent facts. If he fails to require and obtain complete
information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is in no position to plead his own
dereliction as a defense. Absence from headquarters cannot and does not relieve one from
responsibility for acts committed in accordance with a policy he instituted or in which he
acquiesced.”)
24. United States v. von Leeb et al. (High Command Case), 11 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBURG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 543 (1950) (“A high commander cannot keep completely informed of the details
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The tribunal in United States v. Soemu Toyoda, 25 perhaps mindful of the
critiques of the application of command responsibility in the Yamashita trial,
including in the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy, 26 provided a more
precise explication of the relevant legal standards. 27 The Toyoda tribunal took
care to specify the elements of command responsibility and clearly identified
the duty to punish as one of those elements.
The Tribunal considers the essential elements of command responsibility
for atrocities of any commander to be:
1. The offenses, commonly recognized as atrocities, were committed by
troops of his command;
2. The ordering of such atrocities.
In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the issuance of orders, then the essential elements of command responsibility are:
1. As before, that atrocities were actually committed;
2. Notice of the commission thereof. This notice may be either:
a. Actual, as in the case of an accused who sees their commission or
who is informed thereof shortly thereafter; or
of military operations of subordinates and most assuredly not of every administrative measure. He has the right to assume that details entrusted to responsible subordinates will be
legally executed. The President of the United States is Commander in Chief of its military
forces. Criminal acts committed by those forces cannot in themselves be charged to him on
the theory of subordination. The same is true of other high commanders in the chain of
command. Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of command from
that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is
directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. Any other interpretation of international law would go far beyond the basic principles
of criminal law as known to civilized nations.”).
25. United States v. Soemu Toyoda, International Military Tribunal for the Far East
1948.
26. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“He was not charged
with personally participating in the acts or with ordering or condoning their commission.
Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to him. It was simply alleged that he
unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as a commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit acts of atrocity. The
recorded annals of warfare and the established principle of international law afford not the
slightest precedent for such a charge.”).
27. Hays Parks has suggested the more carefully-worded judgment of the Toyoda tribunal, in contrast with the tribunal in Yamashita, was a result of General MacArthur’s intentional inclusion of a law member on the body. See Parks, supra note 5, at 70 n.230 (1973).
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b. Constructive. That is, the commission of such a great number of
offenses within his command that a reasonable man could come
to no other conclusion than that the accused must have known of
the offense or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission.
3. Power of command. That is, the accused must be proved to have had
actual authority over the offenders to issue orders to them not to commit
illegal acts, and to punish offenders.
4. Failure to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to
control the troops under his command and to prevent acts which are violations of the laws of war.
5. Failure to punish offenders.28

The tribunal summarized the commander’s duty to punish under the
heading of “Failure to punish offenders”:
[Toyoda’s] duty as commander included his duty to control his troops, to
take necessary steps to prevent the commission by them of atrocities, and
to punish offenders. . . . If he knew, or should have known . . . of the
commission by his troops of atrocities and if he did not do everything
within his power and capacity under the existing circumstances to prevent
their occurrence and punish the offenders, he was derelict in his duties. 29

For the purposes of international criminal law generally, and U.S. views
of the law in particular, Toyoda provides the earliest clear articulation of the
elements of command responsibility, including the duty to punish.
D. U.S. Army Field Manual and the Necessary and Reasonable Standard
Following World War II, the commander’s duty to punish war crimes by his
subordinates was incorporated into the 1956 U.S. Army Field Manual, FM
27-10:
In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons
subject to their control. Thus, for instance, when troops commit massacres
and atrocities against the civilian population of occupied territory or against

28. United States v. Soemu Toyoda, Official Transcript of Record of Trial 5006, International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1948 (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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prisoners of war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual perpetrators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility arises directly
when the acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an order
of the commander concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has
actual knowledge, or should have knowledge, through reports received by
him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his
control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to
take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law
of war or to punish violators thereof. 30

The version of the duty incorporated into FM 27-10 appears to have
been the first to adopt language requiring “necessary and reasonable” steps
to punish subordinates responsible for war crimes. This necessary and reasonable formulation would be replicated in a number of subsequent codifications of command responsibility in both international and U.S. domestic
legal instruments. 31
E. Codifications of the Duty to Punish and U.S. Views
1.

Additional Protocol I

Although the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 incorporated
the principle of command responsibility at a high-level of generality, 32 Additional Protocol I included the first treaty-based codification of command responsibility as a specific mode of criminal liability and identified the failure
of a commander to punish as a potential basis for criminal responsibility.

30. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE ¶ 501 (1956) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, supra note 4, ¶ 8-31 (“Under international law,
criminal responsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian superiors with similar
authorities and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take ‘necessary and reasonable’ measures to prevent or repress those violations.”).
32. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 1, 43, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539, U.S.T.S. 539 (providing that an armed force must be “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates” and that the commander of a force
occupying enemy territory “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country”).
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1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress
grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches,
of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act
when under a duty to do so.
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if
they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or
repress the breach. 33

Although the United States is not a party to the treaty, a review of Additional
Protocol I by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that “[t]he obligations created by Articles 86 and 87 are well within the precedents for war crimes
liability established by American tribunals after World War II.” 34
2.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

The atrocities that characterized the wars in the former Yugoslavia provided
cause for the United States to reiterate, across two presidential administrations, that military commanders as well as civilian superiors were obligated
under international law to punish subordinates who committed war crimes.
In the waning days of the tenure of President George H. W. Bush, Secretary
of State Lawrence Eagleburger was goaded by author and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel to publicly “name and shame” suspected Balkan war criminals. 35 In a December 1992 speech in Geneva, Eagleburger identified a number of atrocities—the sniping of civilians, massacres, ethnic cleansing, and
the torture of detainees— that had been committed in the wars in the former
Yugoslavia and named specific perpetrators who should face trial for these
crimes. 36 Eagleburger repeatedly referred in his remarks to the responsibilities of both the political leaders and military commanders leading the forces
33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 86, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
34. John W. Vessey Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Review of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 app. (May 3, 1985).
35. Lawrence Eagleburger, Statement at the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland, The Need to Respond to War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia
(Dec. 16, 1992), reprinted in 3 DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 923, 924 (1992).
36. Id. at 923.
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that committed these crimes. In concluding his speech, Eagleburger observed that,
Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond dispute—namely,
the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have described. Leaders such Slobadan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of the Serbian Bosnian Republic, and General Rathko Mladic, commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they
sought to ensure, as they must under international law, that their forces
complied with international law. They ought, if charged, to have the opportunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether and how they
took responsible action to prevent and punish the atrocities I have described
which were undertaken by their subordinates. 37

Although Secretary Eagleburger took care not to squarely conclude
(prior to trial) that the named leaders had committed war crimes, he nonetheless endorsed the principle that under international law such civilian superiors and military commanders had an obligation to punish subordinates
who committed war crimes.
The subsequent creation by the U.N. Security Council of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—as well as the practice of those
courts—were the most significant developments in international criminal
law since the post-World War II war crimes trials. The United States played
a key role in the establishment of both tribunals and in the drafting of their
respective statutes. Contemporaneous statements and positions taken by the
United States related to the ICTY echoed Secretary Eagleburger and made
clear that the United States regarded the duty to punish as well established
under customary international law at the time.
The ICTY was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of May
23, 1993, in which the Security Council decided that the tribunal would have
jurisdiction over “serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be
determined by the Security Council.” 38 The adoption by the Security Council
of an earlier-in-time effective date for the ICTY is notable. In order to avoid
the ex post facto application of criminal law, the Council implicitly recognized
37. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
38. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993).
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that the substantive law to be applied by the ICTY already existed in treaty
or customary international law. In other words, with respect to the law to be
applied by the tribunal, the statute of the ICTY was merely declaratory of
existing law.
The United States later explicitly affirmed, in a 1995 amicus brief submitted to the ICTY, that it understood the law applied by the court to be
pre-existing international law. 39 The United States explained that in creating
the ICTY, “the Council has not attempted to create new humanitarian law
or to interfere with the way in which law is developed. The law to be applied
by the Tribunal is established by convention and customary law, and affirmed by the General Assembly.” 40
The fact that the substantive law of the ICTY was pre-existing conventional and customary law and understood to be so by the United States is
particularly significant with respect to command responsibility.
Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY provides for command responsibility as a mode of responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide, offenses rooted both in treaty and customary international
law. 41 As recognized in the Statute, a commander may incur criminal responsibility for failing to punish his subordinates for war crimes. In language reminiscent of the Army Field Manual’s necessary and reasonable formulation,
Article 7(3) specifies that:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof. 42

Following the Security Council vote establishing the ICTY in 1993, U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright explained U.S. support

39. Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of the Prosecutor of the
Tribunal v. Dusan Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T (July 17, 1995).
40. Id. at 25.
41. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 7(3),
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General Report Pursuant to Paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
1008

U.S. Recognition of a Duty to Punish War Crimes

Vol. 97

for the tribunal and drew attention to a few legal aspects of the ICTY’s statute. She specifically clarified that it was the understanding of the United
States that “individual liability arises in . . . the failure of a superior—whether
political or military—to take reasonable steps to prevent or punish such
crimes by persons under his or her authority.” 43 Albright’s speech is notable
in that she not only recognized that international law imposed a duty to punish upon military commanders, but also that such duty existed for civilian
superiors as well.
Subsequent statements by the United States reemphasized its understanding that with respect to the duty to punish, the ICTY Statute merely
restated existing law. In November 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote in the Boston Globe that “[i]n establishing the tribunal, the Security
Council has reaffirmed a fundamental principle that binds civilized societies:
Those who carry out atrocities must be held accountable for their actions.
So must those who have failed their legal duty to prevent and punish war
crimes.” 44
In a 1994 speech about the Holocaust and the newly established war
crimes tribunal the following year, Ambassador Albright expounded further
on the well-established nature of the duty to punish.
One advantage we have now is Nuremberg itself. Many of the legal arguments put forward by defendants at Nuremberg were disposed of in the
judgments there. Today, there should be no question that political and military leaders may be held criminally accountable if they do not stop atrocities by their followers or do not punish those responsible. 45

Again, Albright reiterated that the duty to punish extended to non-military
superiors.
Thus, as far as the United States was concerned, by 1994 there was “no
question” that under international law a commander had a duty to punish
war crimes committed by his subordinates and could be held criminally liable
for failing to do so. Moreover, as emphasized by both Secretary Eagleburger

43. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25,
1993).
44. Warren Christopher, Opinion, War Crimes Tribunal Will Bring Justice to Those Denied
Peace, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Nov. 7, 1993.
45. Madeline K. Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Address at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum: Bosnia in Light of the Holocaust: War
Crimes Tribunals (Apr. 12, 1994) (emphasis added).
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and Ambassador Albright, this duty under international law applied to both
military commanders and non-military superiors.
3.

The Rome Statute

The United States is famously not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and strongly objects to the ICC asserting jurisdiction over the nationals of non-State parties, including U.S. nationals.
Nonetheless, the United States played a key role in the drafting of what
would become Article 28 of the Rome Statute which provides for command
responsibility.
In a departure from earlier articulations of command responsibility, including those the United States had recognized as reflecting customary international law (such as Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY), the United
States proposed a bifurcated standard for command responsibility for the
Rome Statute.
(a) A commander is criminally responsible for crimes under this Statute
committed by forces under his or her command and effective control as a
result of the commander’s failure to exercise properly this control where:
(i) The commander either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known, that the forces were committing or intending
to commit such crimes; and
(ii) The commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission [or punish the perpetrators thereof];
(b) A civilian superior is criminally responsible for crimes under this Statute
committed by subordinates under his or her authority where:
(i) The superior knew that the subordinates were committing or intending to commit a crime or crimes under this Statute;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the official responsibility of the superior;
(iii) The superior had the ability to prevent or repress the crime or
crimes; and
(iv) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission.46

46. Proposal Submitted by the United States of America for Article 25, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/C.1/L.2. (June 16, 1998).
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Under the U.S. proposal, military commanders would be held to a lower
mens rea standard (i.e., knew or should have known) than civilian superiors
(i.e., knew). 47 However, under both the military and civilian standards proposed by the United States, a superior has not only an ex ante duty to prevent,
but also an ex post duty to “take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his or her power” to repress atrocity crimes and punish the perpetrators
thereof.
The bifurcated proposal was the basis for what would ultimately become
Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Article 28 provides, in pertinent part, that a
military commander or civilian superior may bear criminal responsibility if
he or she “failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” 48
The United States does not appear to have contemporaneously indicated
in public whether it viewed the formulation of command responsibility ultimately incorporated in the Rome Statute as reflecting customary international law. Nonetheless, one U.S. official involved in the negotiations over
the Rome Statute did later note that the United States found the treaty’s formulations to be “acceptable.” 49
4.

Iraqi Special Tribunal

The duty to punish also featured in the war crimes tribunal the United States
helped create in Iraq. Following the 2003 invasion, the U.S.-led occupation
authority governing Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, initiated the
47. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court Rome, 2 Official Records Summary Records of the
Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, at 136, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002) (The U.S. delegate explained that “[t]he main difference
between civilian supervisors and military commanders lay in the nature and scope of their
authority. The latter’s authority rested on the military discipline system, which had a penal
dimension, whereas there was no comparable punishment system for civilians in most countries.”).
48. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
49. William Lietzau, International Criminal Law after Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military
Perspective, 64 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 119, 124 (2001) (former Deputy Legal
Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and member of the U.S. delegation to
the ICC negotiations stating that “a number of provisions regarding general principles of
criminal law were acceptably negotiated, including an appropriate definition of command
responsibility”).
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creation of an Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Iraqis for genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and certain violations of Iraqi criminal law. 50 Article
15(e) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal provided for command responsibility and included a duty to punish, albeit in somewhat different and
broader language than that used in the FM 27-10 formulation.
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 11 to 14 of the present
Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 51

Framed in language reminiscent of Article 28 of the Rome Statute, Article
15(e) is further evidence that the United States recognized the duty to punish
under customary international law.
5.

Incorporation of the Duty to Punish into U.S. Domestic Law

Although neither Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 52 nor the Uniform Code of Military Justice 53 provide for command responsibility as a distinct mode of criminal liability, the international law standard for command responsibility has
been incorporated into two different provisions of U.S. federal law: the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) and the Military Commissions
Act (MCA). Both statues adopt a standard for command responsibility from
international law that includes the duty to punish.
50. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority Regarding
an Iraqi Special Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf.
51. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 15(d), Dec. 10, 2003, reprinted in 43 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 231 (2004) (emphasis added).
52. See Beth Van Schaack, Title 18’s Blind Spot: Superior Responsibility, JUST SECURITY (June
3, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/11066/title-18s-blindspot-superior-responsibility/.
53. See Geoffrey Corn & Rachel Van Landingham, Strengthening American War Crimes
Accountability, 70 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 309, 359 (2020) (noting the absence
of an explicit command responsibility provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and calling for the UCMJ to be revised to include this mode of criminal liability);
Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander—Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time
for the United States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZAGA
LAW REVIEW 335, 343–44 (2006) (analyzing the failure of the UCMJ to explicitly provide
command responsibility liability).
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Torture Victim Protection Act

The TVPA was enacted to “carry out obligations of the United States under
the United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to
the protection of human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of
damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.” 54
Although not mentioned explicitly in the text, the legislative history indicates
that civil liability under the TVPA was intended to apply under the standard
for command responsibility under international criminal law, including the
duty to punish. 55
The two federal circuit courts of appeal to address the issue have held
that pursuant to the international law standard to be applied under the
TVPA, a superior commander may be liable for civil damages due to a failure
to punish subordinates who commit atrocities. In Ford v. Garcia, the Eleventh
Circuit held:
The essential elements of liability under the command responsibility
doctrine are: (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the commander knew or should have known, owing to the circumstances at the
time, that his subordinates had committed, were committing, or planned
to commit acts violative of the law of war; and (3) that the commander
failed to prevent the commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates after the commission of the crimes. Although the TVPA does
not explicitly provide for liability of commanders for human rights violations of their troops, legislative history makes clear that Congress intended
to adopt the doctrine of command responsibility from international law as
part of the Act. Specifically identified in the Senate report is In re Yamashita
. . . a World War II era case involving the command responsibility doctrine
in habeas review of the conviction of a Japanese commander in the Philippines by an American military tribunal. See S. Rep. No. 102–249, at 9 (1991).
Describing Yamashita’s holding, the Senate Report stated that the Supreme
Court found a foreign general “responsible for a pervasive pattern of war
54. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Public Law 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
55. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991) (“Under international law, responsibility for torture, summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who
actually committed those acts—anyone with higher authority who authorized, tolerated or
knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.”).
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crimes (1) committed by his officers when (2) he knew or should have
known they were going on but (3) failed to prevent or punish them.” 56

Notably, the Department of State later excerpted Ford’s analysis of command
responsibility (again including the duty to punish) in its annual digest of U.S.
practice in international law. 57
In Chavez v. Carranza, the Sixth Circuit adopted the same command responsibility standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Ford, including
the duty to punish. 58
ii.

Military Commissions

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush ordered the creation of
military commissions to try suspected terrorist for “violations of the laws of
war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.” 59 The Department of
Defense subsequently set forth the crimes triable by military commission in
Military Commission Instruction No. 2. The instruction explained that the
offenses were declaratory of existing international law.

56. Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Doe v. Drummond
Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ford, 289 F.3d at 1288); Penaloza v.
Drummond Company, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1344 (N.D. Ala 2019) (“Three indispensable elements are required to support a claim for liability under the command responsibility
doctrine: (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the commander
and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the commander knew or should have known,
owing to the circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had committed, were committing, or planned to commit acts violative of the law of war; and (3) that the commander
failed to prevent the commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates after
the commission of the crimes.”).
57. 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 6, at 348–
49.
58. Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 499 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Three elements must be
established for command responsibility to apply: (1) a superior-subordinate relationship between the defendant/military commander and the person or persons who committed human rights abuses; (2) the defendant/military commander knew, or should have known, in
light of the circumstances at the time, that subordinates had committed, were committing,
or were about to commit human rights abuses; and (3) the defendant/military commander
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent human rights abuses and
punish human rights abusers.”).
59. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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No offense is cognizable in a trial by military commission if that offense
did not exist prior to the conduct in question. These crimes and elements
derive from the law of armed conflict, a body of law that is sometimes
referred to as the law of war. They constitute violations of the law of armed
conflict or offenses that, consistent with that body of law are triable by
military commission. Because this document is declarative of existing law,
it does not preclude trial for crimes that occurred prior to its effective
date. 60

The instruction specified “command/superior responsibility” as a mode of
liability and explicitly identified the duty to punish in language reminiscent
of the ICTY Statute.
Command/Superior Responsibility – Perpetrating
a. Elements.
(1) The accused had command and control, or effective authority and control, over one or more subordinates;
(2) One or more of the accused’s subordinates committed, attempted to
commit, conspired to commit, solicited to commit, or aided or abetted the
commission of one or more substantive offenses triable by military
commission;
(3) The accused either knew or should have known that the subordinate or
subordinates were committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, soliciting, or aiding or abetting such offense or offenses; and
(4) The accused failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within
his power to prevent or repress the commission of the offense or offenses. 61

Thus, Military Commission Instruction No. 2 further reinforces the point
that the United States viewed the duty to punish as an element of command
responsibility under the pre-existing (customary) law of war in 2003.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 62 which
held that the initial incarnation of the military commissions was unlawful,
Congress enacted the 2006 Military Commissions Act (2006 MCA). 63 The
2006 MCA states: “This chapter establishes procedures governing the use of
60. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, ¶ 3(A) (Apr.
30, 2003).
61. Id. ¶ 6(C)(3)(a).
62. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
63. P.L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in
hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other
offenses triable by military commission.” 64 Echoing the earlier Military Commission Instruction No. 2, the 2006 MCA specified that “the provisions of
this subchapter codify offenses that have traditionally been triable by military
commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist
before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military
commission.” 65
Once again, the pre-existing law declared by the 2006 MCA included a
duty to punish as an element of command responsibility, in substantially the
same language as the earlier Military Commission Instruction No. 2.
Any person is punishable as a principal under this chapter who—
(1) commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, or procures its commission;
(2) causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be
punishable by this chapter; or
(3) is a superior commander who, with regard to acts punishable under this
chapter, knew, had reason to know, or should have known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof. 66

The 2009 Military Commissions Act also included substantially the same
standard for command responsibility as its predecessor, including the duty
to punish. 67 The 2009 MCA, signed into law by President Obama, again purported to codify existing law, incorporating “offenses that have traditionally
been triable under the law of war or otherwise triable by military commission.” Senator Lindsey Graham (at the time a reserve judge advocate in the
U.S. Air Force) emphasized this point on the floor of the Senate. “Congress

64. Id. § 948b.
65. Id. § 950p.
66. Id. § 950q (emphasis added).
67. Pub. L. No. 111-84 §§ 1801-07 (2009) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950q(3) (“a superior
commander who, with regard to [war crimes], knew, had reason to know, or should have
known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and who failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof, is a principal”).
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has codified offenses which have traditionally been tried by military commissions under customary international law,” 68 he stated.
IV.

CONTRARY EVIDENCE

There does not appear to be any indication that the United States has ever
specifically rejected or called into question the duty to punish as an element
of command responsibility. Moreover, all formulations of the standard for
command responsibility endorsed by the United States over the last fifty
years as reflecting customary international law have incorporated some version of a duty to punish.
That said, the United States has not always been precise in articulating
the standard for command responsibility. This imprecision is especially true
with respect to many of the post-World War II war crimes cases (e.g., Yamashita, the High Command Case, and the Hostage Case) which did not clearly
define the standard for command responsibility being applied. Likewise,
some commentaries on the law of war by the Department of Defense have
failed to identify the specific elements of command responsibility. 69
V.

CONCLUSION

The weight of evidence establishes that all three branches of the U.S. government have recognized that under customary international law, a commander has a duty to punish subordinates who commit war crimes and that
the failure to fulfill this duty may itself constitute a war crime. Although the
formulation and applicability of this duty have evolved since Americans first
68. 111 CONG. REC. S10663 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Lindsay Graham).
69. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1140–41 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) (identifying command responsibility
as a mode of liability and citing to the ICTY and ICTR statutes, as well as the High Command
Case, but not specifically identifying or endorsing a standard for command responsibility);
but see FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, supra note 4, ¶ 8-6 (“Under international law, criminal responsibility may also fall on commanders or certain civilian superiors with similar authorities
and responsibilities as military commanders if they had actual knowledge or constructive
knowledge of their subordinates’ actions and failed to take ‘necessary and reasonable’
measures to prevent or repress those violations. That is, commanders may be held responsible if they knew or should have known, through reports received by them or by other
means, that troops or other persons subject to their control were about to commit or have
committed a war crime and did nothing to prevent such crimes or punish the violators.”).
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acknowledged it in the colonial period, a few salient points are worth emphasizing regarding U.S. views on the duty to punish.
First, the duty to punish is a duty imposed on individuals by international
law, specifically the law of war, not merely domestic law. The individual duty
is in addition to whatever obligations a State may have under international
law to extradite or punish war criminals. Second, at least since the 1990s, the
United States has understood this duty to punish to apply to civilian superiors as well as military commanders. Third, as explained by the U.S. representatives in Versailles in 1919, the duty to punish is not one of strict liability.
A commander or superior must have knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the crimes of his subordinates for the duty to be triggered.
Discussions of, and efforts to promote, accountability for atrocity
crimes, both domestically and abroad, should be informed by the United
States’ own long-standing view that a commander’s failure to take necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to punish war crimes by
his subordinates may itself amount to a war crime.
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